existing literature on all of these issues. An entertainer herself, as well as a historian, Forbes has carefully crafted a meticulous, balanced, and comprehensive examination of Williams as acclaimed performer, racialized figure, and complex showroom not found elsewhere.

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Smithers, Gregory D.
Science, Sexuality, and Race in the United States and Australia, 1780s–1890s
New York: Routledge.
298 pp., $95.00, ISBN 978-0-415-98977-0.
Publication Date: November 2008

Anyone familiar with historiography—or perhaps with history in general—knows that nineteenth-century white people in the Western world felt compelled to prove that they were superior to darker-skinned Others in order to justify their discriminatory and often brutal colonization policies, but few historians have carefully examined the complicated evolution of their efforts in the way that Gregory D. Smithers does in Science, Sexuality, and Race in the United States and Australia, 1780s–1890s. Using Louis Hartz’s argument (The Founding of New Societies, Harcourt, Brace and World 1964) that colonies developed according to the intellectual currents of their time as his theoretical impetus, Smithers, a lecturer in the school of divinity, history, and philosophy at the University of Aberdeen (UK), locates this two-part, extensively evidenced study of whiteness in the intersection of intellectual, cultural, gender, and reform histories. In doing so he demonstrates not only that white racist discourse devalued (if not dehumanized) darker-skinned people in the United States and Australia by placing them in the lowest ranks of a racial hierarchy that elevated white men to its pinnacle, but also that white people did so in an attempt to alleviate their own feelings of insecurity about both the morality of their treatment of colorized peoples and their self-proclaimed racial superiority.

Although most historical studies of whiteness focus on the impact the white race—in Theodore W. Allen’s words, the “truly peculiar institution” (The Invention of the White Race: Volume One [Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 1994], 24)—had on immigrants or labor, Smithers delves first into scholarly, reform, and political debates over how to reproduce “civilization” in settler colonies in order to “chart changes in the biological and cultural definition of whiteness” between 1780 and 1890 (5). He then analyzes the ways “the association of whiteness with civilization became a ‘scientific’ truism that . . . structured social interactions, land use patterns, and institutional efforts to govern ‘non-white’ peoples” (3).

This work is therefore an important addition to the study of whiteness, but perhaps its most significant impact is on our understanding of the ways whiteness shaped gendered behavior and, therefore, politics. Smithers’s discussion of women is primarily focused on colonized women, graphically reiterating what other scholars have demonstrated about the ways white men abused them sexually, but his discussion of men’s behavior—and the debates and policies that grew out of it—greatly enriches our knowledge of the relationships between masculinity and politics.

Smithers argues that, although white Europeans, Australians, and Americans agreed that whiteness was culturally and biologically malleable, two distinct understandings of the consequences of that malleability emerged by the mid-nineteenth century. According to one understanding (which became dominant in Australia), whiteness constituted a robustness that could elevate darker-skinned people both culturally, through education, and biologically, through intermarriage, which “progressively whitened” them (51). According to the other understanding (dominant in the United States), whiteness was fragile and vulnerable to the debilitating effects of darker-skinned—especially black—people’s blood.

Smithers reveals that neither Americans’ belief that whiteness was fragile nor Australians’ belief that it was robust prevented white settler colonists from kidnapping, raping, murdering, or at least confining darker-skinned people. However, members of subaltern populations were familiar with the ethnographic scholarship fueling those beliefs, and they used that knowledge to firmly and eloquently reject both the notion that whites represented civilization and white people’s claim that assimilation represented the desire to be white, as well as to fight against white domination. In doing so, they forged new, hybrid identities that valued both their ethnic heritages and white people’s educational, political, and economic institutions. They also forced white men to identify themselves more openly as what Amy Greenburg (in Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire [Cambridge University Press, 2005]) has called martial men (who embraced exclusion, aggression, conquest, and violence as the means to their dominance) or Christian gentlemen (who desired a more humane interaction with Others).

Smithers is most persuasive in arguing that the difference between Australian and American perceptions of whiteness hinged on white men’s self-perceived power: in the United States—where white men felt threatened by the abolition movement, the Civil War, the emancipation and enfranchisement of African Americans, Native American resistance, labor agitation, and the women’s rights movement—whiteness was fragile. In Australia, where British law prohibited slavery and there was an “enduring assumption that the Aborigines were a dying race” (85), white men had only each other and white women as contenders for political and economic status. This is an ambitious book, and—like the best books—it has occasional inconsistencies and evidentiary holes. However, its value to a general and college audience far outweighs its minor weaknesses.

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Hill, Christopher L.
National History and the World of Nations: Capital, State, and the Rhetoric of History in Japan, France, and the United States
Durham, NC: Duke University Press
Publication Date: January 2009

In National History and the World of Nations, Christopher L. Hill, associate professor of Japanese literature at Yale University, explores nationalism across three late-nineteenth-century societies.
Hill finds that Japanese, American, and French voices, facing the universalization of a global modernity consisting of the nation-state and global capitalism, used common epistemological strategies to construct unifying national histories. Two themes structure the book—how such histories manage the “spatial boundaries of historical representation” and “the temporalities of national history” (xii).

The attempts of each of these nations to locate itself in national historical space required an epistemological change that positioned the nation uniquely in the global political economy. This rhetoric implemented an inversion, whereby conditions that nurtured the creation of the nation were elided and instead made its mission. This not only positioned the nation in the broader world of nations, but also recruited the domestic population into the nation’s mission, thereby limiting dissension. In Japan—located in the global periphery and with a national space vulnerable to spreading Western dominance—liberal nationalists positioned Japan in histories of civilization, advocated expanding international political and economic intercourse in order to establish and expand Japan’s international standing, and sought to unify the population behind this task. In the United States—a settler society whose experience of the closing of the frontier brought different spatial anxieties—voices sought a consolidation of national space in terms of race or Americanization, with a sense that progress was to be gained by increasing capital circulation. In France—which experienced a closing of space after the loss of Alsace-Lorraine to Prussia, despite remaining at the center of the global political economy—national histories envisioned unity through regional economic interconnections and emphasized national regeneration through voluntaristic commitment to a nonhistorical concept of nation.

This epistemological shift also located the nation temporally. National histories needed to interpret the past, present, and future with sufficient coherence to explain past political ruptures and delegitimize views that rendered the nation unimportant. Narrative strategies commonly involved allegory, containment, and future anteriority. In Japan, the Meiji Restoration was interpreted as an event that brought Japan into the flow of universal history. Hortatory stories of increasing individual self-awareness allegorically pointed toward increasing national self-awareness. In the multiracial and post–Civil War United States, where common history was difficult to find, voices used an ahistorical idea of an idealized national future to create a unifying vision emphasizing race, Americanization, or spiritual kinship with the nation. French debates, which revolved around interpretations of the 1789 Revolution, used past history as lessons for the present, valorized sentiment for nation over differences (e.g., race or language), and emphasized the works of the Revolution that benefited all subsequent citizens. These narrative strategies created an epistemological shift that naturalized the nation as a universal and provided a place for individual participation while stifling political dissent.

In all three cases, however, these strategies also produced instability. The language of intercourse and exchange (e.g., capital, race) not only established and developed the nation, it also revealed the porosity of national boundaries. Moreover, these strategies required interpretations that glossed over historical ruptures that were difficult to explain away. Such glosses could not fully alleviate the present sense of national crisis and disunity. Finally, these visions commonly resorted to territorial expansion and limiting female participation.

As good studies do, this work raises further questions. Those who define and use a concept of global modernity, as Hill does, run the risk of inhibiting the analysis of significant differences under a universalizing analytical rubric. Although recognizing political and economic configurations that impact all societies globally is useful, a vision of multiple modernities may better recognize how individuals and societies—especially nonliberal ones—have been seeking fundamentally differing visions for dealing with the modern. The focus on liberal voices—vaguely defined—raises questions regarding whether nonliberal voices differently influenced these societies’ visions of community and even nation.

Still, that the writings of liberals in Japan, the United States, and France in the late nineteenth century returned to common epistemological strategies—despite substantial differences in context and expression—is significant, and the manner in which this is demonstrated is impressive. This book provides a hefty contribution to recent discussions of nationalism and history. Readers will find it helpful to see this alongside Stefan Berger’s Writing the Nation (Palgrave, 2007) and Narrating the Nation: Representations in History, Media, and the Arts, edited by Berger, Eriksonas, and Mycock, (Berghahn, 2008), as they share themes. Somewhat less direct but still relevant are the discussions of history and nation offered by Julia Randolph in History and Nation (Bucknell, 2006).

Clossy, Luke
Salvation and Globalization in the Early Jesuit Missions
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
336 pp., $99.00, ISBN 978-0521887441
Publication Date: March 2008

Salvation and Globalization in the Early Jesuit Missions is an impressively researched book that at first glance may seem like a work of comparative history. However, the book is a study of an enterprise (the Jesuit missions), a concept (salvation), and their global context. To wit, this is a “non-comparative study of a single transregional phenomenon” (10). Broadly speaking, Luke Clossy sets out to examine the connections in the Jesuits’ global mission efforts. More specifically, the book examines the connections between the Jesuit missions and missionaries in China, Mexico, and Germany. This may seem counterintuitive or even overly ambitious, and the author is well aware of it. Indeed, in the introduction Clossy notes that nearly two-thirds of all Jesuit missionaries in the early modern period were Portuguese and that the “trinity of Rome, Portugal and China—or, better, Spain, Mexico and the Philippines—would have been a more likely choice” (11). Instead, he focuses on the missions in China, Mexico, and Germany in order to focus on the other goal of his study: to analyze the Jesuits’ collective ideas about and efforts toward salvation. In Clossy’s view, comparative studies of missionaries that emphasize globalization have tended to play down the