By 1936, Italy stepped aside, and Japan was awarded the 1940 Games at a Berlin meeting on the eve of what would be known as the Nazi Games. Collins provides a detailed account of the domestic debates and IOC tensions that quickly emerged after the initial euphoria of success. Recent scholarship has drawn attention to the highly charged politics of aesthetic movements in the 1930s, and Collins’s book draws attention to the importance of the Olympic Games in this cauldron of heated domestic politics about how to frame and deploy a nationalized Japanese culture. The mounting military operations in China, and subsequent threats of an Olympic boycott, renewed Japanese governmental concerns about the Games, and in mid-1938, Japan informed the IOC in a telegram that it was canceling the Games “owing to protracted hostilities with no prospect immediate peace [sic].” The telegram went on to indicate Japan’s determination to apply for the 1944 Games! These too never took place, but Collins concludes her book by showing how many of the themes that played out during the 1930s were transposed in a postwar register and shaped the iteration of the bidding, planning, and hosting of the 1964 Tokyo Games.

This is an absorbing book. Collins develops the decade’s story as a chronological narrative, drawing impressively on a wide range of contemporary publications and documents. Ironically, it is one of the most complete studies we have of the full course of a Games cycle; most other works of individual Games are necessarily drawn to the athletic events themselves. Because the events were “missing” in this case, Collins can focus on what is actually of greater scholarly significance—the turbulent lead-up and the lasting legacies. This is not narrow sports history but rather a fine example of a fully situated historical account of a complex sports process.


Reviewed by
SHELDON GARON
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This is an extraordinary book. One of the hottest fields of history recently has been global or transnational history. Scholars are keen to transcend national histories to chart the movements of peoples, ideas, and institutions across national boundaries. For the most part, these efforts have yet to realize their promise. In particular, attempts to insert the United States into global history generally suffer from the unwillingness to master the
languages and historiographies necessary to study interactions with other peoples and countries. Spatially, transnational history remains centered on the world of the North Atlantic, with some additional work on relationships between Western nations and their colonies. The exclusion of East Asia, especially Japan, from most global histories has been a glaring gap. Japan, after all, emerged as one of the world’s most dynamic nation-states during the late nineteenth century and achieved great-power status after 1900. Japanese moreover became transnational learners par excellence, energetically engaging in the study of Western texts and practices—and, after the Russo-Japanese War, furnishing models of “national efficiency” to Westerners and Asians alike. If we wish the field of transnational history to be truly global, scholars of Japan should not wait for historians of the West to include Japan. We should exploit our “comparative advantage”—our mastery of a difficult language and a lesser-known history—while utilizing our native tongue and knowledge of at least one European language to broaden discussions of global interactions and other histories.

Christopher Hill has done just that in this magisterial study of the emergence of national histories in nineteenth-century Japan, France, and the United States. It is worth noting that he is not a historian by training but a scholar of Japanese and comparative literature. Hill relies not only on Japanese sources but also on French-language tracts and writings from the United States. The book stands at the intersection of textual analysis and history, to the enrichment of both. Hill builds on a small yet growing body of transnational history that examines the simultaneous emergence of nationalism and internationalism toward the end of the nineteenth century. The concurrence of these developments is no paradox, he argues. This was the moment when thinkers and leaders in a number of countries sought to construct strong nation-states. They necessarily drew on international relations—cultural, political, and economic—to envision how to mobilize resources and people. That is, each aspiring power adopted common elements from transnational discourses on nation building. These included universal elementary education, national anthems, pledges of allegiance, and standardized political institutions that would facilitate diplomatic relations between nations. As Hill explains, each country participated in a “single modernity” embedded in “global capitalism and the system of sovereign states” (p. ix).

National history, the focus of Hill’s study, serves as a stimulating example of this transnational imagining of the modern nation-state. Publicists and officials found it necessary to write histories that would situate their respective nation within the emerging international order. These histories

aimed to give each nation distinct identities that would impress other powers while “enlightening” one’s own people to work and sacrifice for the nation as a whole. At the same time, national history was harnessed to justify the domination of weaker countries. Contemporary European discourses influenced the Meiji era’s Fukuzawa Yukichi and others to re-present Japanese history as the rise of “civilization” and progress, and conversely to depict China and Korea as in decline.

Like other fine books, this one lends itself to being read in various ways by various disciplines. Transnational historians may be most interested in the first chapter on “National History and the Shape of the Nineteenth-Century World.” Hill makes a compelling case for including the United States and France alongside Meiji Japan. All three experienced general currents of the nineteenth century: evolution of interstate relations, growing international trade, and the revolution in communications. The accelerating “travel of texts” prompted American and Japanese writers to envision their own national stories in terms of European narratives of progress, even as they sometimes strove to trumpet particularities. In addition, the three countries undertook the task of writing national histories at the same moment and in response to simultaneous crises and transformations brought on by the American Civil War, Meiji Restoration, and the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71). The inclusion of Third Republic France is refreshing, considering the common preoccupation with comparing Japanese and German historical development. The French Revolution and the prospect of a more thoroughgoing “second” revolution inspired Japanese progressives. The Meiji regime, for its part, emulated institutions of the French bureaucratic state.

The remainder of the book should stimulate historians, although literary scholars will feel more at home with the close reading of numerous texts in relation to national history. The texts themselves range widely. There is Fukuzawa’s geographical primer, Sekai kuni zukushi (All the countries of the world), but also the Meiji political novel Setchūbai (Plum blossoms in snow) by Suehiro Tetchō and Mori Ōgai’s “Maihime” (The dancing girl). American texts include Mark Twain’s The Gilded Age and Woodrow Wilson’s speech, “Princeton in the Nation’s Service.” The French case is illuminated by among others Le tour de la France par deux enfants (A tour of France by two children), a travelogue for schoolchildren, as well as Victor Hugo’s Quatrevingt-treize (Ninety-three) about the Revolution. Hill divides the book into national history’s spatial and temporal aspects in each country. The first part on “spaces of history” demonstrates the use of new histories to excise localism and read back the existence of a unified nation. These histories also naturalized current expansion—notably Japanese control over the Ryukyu islands and Hokkaido, westward expansion in the United States, and efforts by Paris to reclaim Alsace-Lorraine and standardize disparate populations within France.
Part 2 deals with issues of time, particularly how history writers chose their nation’s past. Hill challenges conventional understandings of the mid-Meiji era when elites were said to have enshrined the ancient imperial institution as history. Reading Tokutomi Sohō’s *Shōrai no Nihon* (The future Japan), he argues that many influential thinkers found little in pre-1868 Japanese history with which to construct a modern nation. Instead, they adopted European history as their own, or rather they related the European past to Japan’s future. This is an excellent point, and I think Hill might go further. Despite efforts to establish the imperial myth, most Meiji state officials—like Tokutomi—located Japan’s future within the story of “progress” they saw unfolding in Europe.

The book also deals with the different ways in which writers grappled with the issue of race. Japanese definitions of nation appear most rooted in a volkish history of exclusiveness, although the selected texts generally do not treat race explicitly. Third Republic histories, on the other hand, asserted the principle that anyone living within the nation’s borders—real or imagined—was “French.” American texts, as Hill presents them, offer the most contestation. Some like Henry James depicted Americans as an exceptional people with no history, unlike Europeans who remained bound by feudal conventions of the past. Represented here by the anti-immigration activist John Fiske, many others traced America back to Anglo-Saxon tribes in Germany. Influenced by “whiteness” studies, Hill may have overplayed the Gilded Age’s racial definitions of nation. Most immigrant families quickly identified with the first settlers’ Thanksgiving and with the founding fathers. Americanness proved unusually inclusive. Excepting African Americans, individuals could not be legally denied citizenship and civil rights on the basis of ethnicity. Yet I do find Hill convincing in his conclusion that the three nations were more alike than different. Writers in each country devoted less space to racializing their history and more to imagining “progress” in the past that would serve the future.

In general, Hill does an impressive job of bridging the divide between literature and history. There are, however, some areas where the author might have done more to persuade historians. One concerns the representativeness of the texts. After a brief discussion in the preface, he is not always clear about what constitutes a “national history.” Must such a text have demonstratively shaped dominant discourses? School textbooks, popular histories, and works of professional historians tend to be treated as one, whereas they might have been compared across nations by genre. The selection of texts necessarily affects the analysis. The Japanese texts are diverse, although official histories and voices of state leaders are noticeably absent. The American texts emphasize narratives that particularize the nation—no doubt a powerful position. Nonetheless, influential groups of Federal officials and reformers looked across the Atlantic for clues as to the nation’s
future in the decades following the Civil War. Their United States would move firmly along the European historical trajectory.\(^2\) For that matter, the book forgoes the opportunity to explicate and compare texts that dealt with the trauma of the Civil War itself. The Third Republic confronted defeat in the Franco-Prussian War and internecine strife in the suppression of the Paris Commune. Surely Southerners and Northerners emerged from the Civil War with readings of national history at least as divergent.

Although this study includes intriguing discussions of “the state,” it might have rigorously compared representations of the state in each nation’s histories. The analysis is at its best in Hill’s observations about France, where we read about “a state beyond history.” Under the Third Republic, left and right could agree on nothing about the original Revolution other than the legitimacy of the powerful French state. But why not go further? How did it become possible for the French to dehistoricize and depoliticize the state? How was “the state” represented? As a bureaucracy or a nation? The author might further have pondered why national histories in the United States did not revolve around the state. Curiously, the state appears unproblematic in his American texts, notwithstanding a four-year Civil War fought over its very existence. Finally, the French connection may illuminate the Japanese histories. As Itô Hirobumi’s Commentaries on the Constitution of the Empire of Japan reveal, Meiji leaders and intellectuals crafted a modern transcendent state that traced itself back to ancient imperial times yet incorporated French ideas of the state as embodiment and protector of the nation.

I raise these points not as a critique of the book and its argument but as one historian’s respectful elaboration. This is a path-breaking work with interdisciplinary and global reach.


Reviewed by DAIJING YANG
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The last several decades have witnessed a surge of scholarly interest in the Japanese empire. Manchuria—the northeastern provinces of China where